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This paper considers evidence provided by large neuropsychological group studies and meta-analyses 
of functional imaging experiments on the location in frontal cortex of the subprocesses involved in the 
carrying out of task-switching paradigms. The function of the individual subprocesses is also considered 
in the light of analyses of the performance of normal subjects.
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of their shapes, in their colour and in how many 
there are. The clinician has another set of cards each 
of which matches one of the key cards in colour, 
another in shape and so on. The patient is given one 
card at a time and has to place it with the key card 
which has the same value on one of the dimensions. 
The correct match is dictated by a rule in operation, 
which can be to match by colour or by shape or by 
number. Every so often, the rule changes and the 
patient must discover the new rule by trial and error. 
The cognitive component that is held to be impaired 
by lateral frontal lesions in such a task is set shifting. 
The prototypical lateral prefrontal patient contin-
ues to use the previously relevant rule after the rule 
changes, even though he or she is being told on each 
trial that the match is incorrect. What appears to be 
lost is the ability to shift from seeing one attribute of 
the stimulus as being relevant to seeing another.
Performance on such clinical tests, however, is 
very complex to analyse as there are many relevant 
cognitive components; Wisconsin Card-Sorting, 
Task switching is the area of research concerned 
with how a subject effects a change in the rules that 
govern how he or she responds to incoming stimuli. 
As an area of research, it is situated at the conﬂ  uence 
of two intellectual traditions. Within human exper-
imental psychology the study of cognitive control 
processes in normal subjects had seen important 
theoretical and experimental advances with the 
work of Atkinson and Shiffrin (1968) and Schneider 
and Shiffrin (1977). In complementary fashion, 
clinical neuropsychological investigations of lateral 
prefrontal functions had seen the development of 
tests for assessing executive functions including the 
Wisconsin Card-Sorting (Milner, 1963) and the 
Extra-Dimensional Intra-Dimensional Shift test of 
the CANTAB battery (Owen et al., 1990).
As an example of a relevant clinical test, in 
Wisconsin Card-Sorting, the patient is presented 
with four cards on each of which there is a set of col-
oured shapes, all the shapes on any one card being 
identical. These four ‘key’ cards differ in the form 80 | July  2008 | Volume  2 | Issue  1  www.frontiersin.org
Figure 1 | The experimental paradigm used in Shallice et al. (2008b). It is derived from the paradigm developed by Meiran (1996).
for example, is affected in a qualitatively different 
fashion by lesions in different parts of prefrontal 
cortex (Stuss et al., 2000). Moreover, such prefron-
tal clinical tests are poorly adapted to the isolation 
by purely behavioural means of critical subcom-
ponents. So exploration of the performance of 
normal subjects in these paradigms in the fashion 
typical of human experimental psychology, virtu-
ally never occurred. Cognitive psychology and neu-
ropsychology remained separate to their mutual 
disadvantage.
In the 1990s, developments in so-called ‘task-
switching’ experimental paradigms provided an 
avenue to overcome this separation between the dif-
ferent research traditions. These experimental para-
digms are also beginning to allow us to distinguish 
key components that contribute to performance in 
normal subjects, a key step in designing clinical tests 
which isolate different components of prefrontal 
functioning. The central cognitive component is 
again set-shifting. Typically on each trial of a task-
switching experiment a stimulus is presented which 
can be conceived of in one of a number of ways, 
typically two (see Figure 1). Two studies essentially 
initiated the modern use of this type of paradigm 
in normal subjects, those of Allport et  al. (1994) 
and Rogers and Monsell (1995). In the second of 
these, subjects are presented with a letter and a digit. 
On some trials it is the letter which is relevant and 
the subject must respond by pressing one of two 
keys as quickly as possible as to whether the letter is 
a consonant or a vowel. On other trials the relevant 
part of the stimulus is the digit and the subject must 
make the corresponding decision between odd and 
even. In the Rogers and Monsell type of procedure 
it is possible for the subject to predict in advance 
which task is relevant. The letter-digit combina-
tion appears in one of four panes (quadrants) of 
a square on each trial, and the position of the pair 
moves consistently round the panes in turn; in the 
two upper positions one task is operative, in the two 
lower positions the other. Shortly thereafter, Meiran 
(1996) introduced the procedure of the cueing of the 
task by a distinctive warning signal occurring before 
stimulus presentation; this enabled the relevant task 
to be varied randomly across trials. His paradigm 
also used four panes of a square (see Figure 1). 
A circle appears in one of the four panes. The 
response key to be pressed depends on which dimen-
sion of the square is currently operative. If it is the 
vertical dimension, then the subject must make a 
top-bottom decision. If, instead, it is the horizontal 
dimension then the subject must make a left–right 
decision. Which of the two tasks is operative on a 
particular trial is indicated through a warning sig-
nal just before the stimulus. This means that the 
task that is relevant can be randomised across trials 
unlike on the Rogers and Monsell design.
This original group of experiments showed 
that if stimuli require different responses depend-
ing on which task is operative, then trials where 
the task switches from the previous trial are slower 
than those where the task repeats – the difference 
between the two reaction times is known as the 
switch effect. Moreover, the size of the switch effect 
generally decreases with an increase in the time 
available in which the subject can prepare for the 
speciﬁ  c task. This led Rogers and Monsell to pro-
pose that there is a top-down process of task recon-
ﬁ  guration which takes appreciable time and which 
is measurable by the decrease in switch effect. The 
paradigm appeared to provide a measure of the 
time to switch the dimension of the stimulus that 
should control behaviour. However, Allport et al. 
(1994) found that the switch effect was less when 
switching is into a more difﬁ  cult task than into an 
easier one, and argued that the switch effect was 
due instead to the need to inhibit a previously active 
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task-set or action schema, namely the control proc-
ess that determines which task is undertaken. These 
two types of explanation are not necessarily in con-
ﬂ  ict, since they can be represented in different levels 
of a relatively simple computational model of task-
switching of the interactive activation type (Gilbert 
and Shallice, 2002). On such a model, though, the 
switch cost as measured from reaction times, no 
longer corresponds quantitatively to the time that 
the internal process of task reconﬁ  guration takes.
The incorporation of this type of experimental 
paradigm into the behavioural literature led to an 
explosion of studies. However, it became rapidly 
realised that the paradigm, apparently so simple, 
had many complexities and involved many differ-
ent processes (e.g. Monsell, 2003). For instance, 
Allport and Wylie (2000) discovered that presen-
tation of a stimulus associated with a previously 
active task-set would tend to reactivate it. At much 
the same time Meiran et al. (2000) in somewhat 
conﬂ  icting fashion showed that task-set effects dis-
sipate over time. Despite these complications the 
basic paradigms, together with the scores of sub-
sequent variants (e.g. Brass and von Cramon, 2002; 
Braver et al., 2003), while complex, remain much 
simpler than the clinical tests from which they were 
originally derived. The complexity of the under-
lying processes, however, means that a return to 
brain-based studies – functional neuro-imaging and 
lesion studies – becomes critically necessary if the 
components are to be isolated. This is based on the 
assumption that the different cognitive resources 
involved are differently localised; if so the degree to 
which a particular cognitive resource is used in a 
given condition can be measured or the effect of its 
loss discovered.
Interpretation of the functional imaging stud-
ies, though, has not been straightforward. Many 
regions of cortex can be involved including pari-
etal and even the anterior insula cortex (Wager 
et al., 2004). Even restricting attention to prefrontal 
cortex, some studies (e.g. DiGirolamo et al., 2001; 
Luks et al., 2002) have obtained a large number of 
activation maxima (>10) for relevant contrasts. In a 
meta-analysis of task-switching, set-shifting and 
stimulus-response reversal studies, Derrfuss et al. 
(2005) found many regions in frontal cortex that 
showed relatively consistent effects; these include 
the inferior frontal junction – a region in the vicin-
ity of the junction of the inferior frontal sulcus 
and the inferior precentral sulcus – the inferior 
frontal sulcus itself, the inferior frontal gyrus, the 
medial superior frontal gyrus, the anterior cingu-
late and the pre-SMA, activations generally involv-
ing both hemispheres. However the consistency 
was only relative; for instance, of the seven pure 
task-  switching studies, in only two was a maximum 
noted in the inferior frontal gyrus, which was the 
largest region and the second most signiﬁ  cant in 
the meta-  analysis. In a second meta-analysis by 
Buchsbaum et al. (2005), using many of the same 
source studies, the set of distinct regions found by 
Derrfuss et al. (2005) essentially clustered into two 
prefrontal regions in each hemisphere. Buchsbaum 
et al. (2005) related their ﬁ  ndings to studies involv-
ing simple go/no-go tasks which require response 
inhibition, and so suggested that the right frontal 
regions involved in the switching task might medi-
ate the inhibition of a previous response rule.
Given the potentially large number of prefron-
tal regions suggested to be relevant from the func-
tional imaging meta-analyses, neuropsychological 
studies of patients with focal frontal lesions seem 
potentially important. In particular, they have the 
advantage that the impairment of a component 
can produce signature effects which help to nar-
row down hypotheses on the underlying functional 
processes. This is particularly the case if neuropsy-
chological studies of task-switching are carried out 
in conjunction with parallel studies of related para-
digms, which potentially involve different combi-
nations of the same set of subsystems.
A number of studies of task switching have 
been carried out in neurological patients (see for 
instance, Mayr et al., 2006; Mecklinger et al., 1999), 
but they have mainly involved small numbers of 
patients and so are not suitable for differential 
localisation of subcomponents within prefrontal 
cortex. Our paper, that of Shallice et al. (2008b), 
is only the second study of task-switching with a 
sizeable number of patients with lesions in differ-
ent parts of prefrontal cortex, the ﬁ  rst being that 
of Aron et al. (2004). These two studies reported 
ﬁ  ndings on 41 and 36 frontal patients respectively. 
Aron et al. (2004), using a version of the Rogers–
Monsell paradigm, found that both patients with 
left frontal lesions and ones with right frontal 
lesions showed a signiﬁ  cantly larger switch cost 
than controls. The right frontal group also showed 
a dramatically elevated error rate on switch trials. 
The  Shallice et  al. (2008b) study which instead 
used the Meiran paradigm also found a left frontal 
effect, but this time on errors. The major reaction 
time effect we found was a striking slowing on both 
switch and repeat trials for patients with superior 
medial prefrontal lesions. An increase in errors in 
conditions where two tasks are potentially relevant 
on any given trial was also found for patients with 
inferior medial prefrontal lesions.
The results of the two studies, like the functional 
imaging studies, suggest that many parts of pre-
frontal cortex can potentially play distinct roles in 
task-switching. The divergence of results across the 
two studies highlights the importance of differences 
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in both the speciﬁ   c behavioural paradigms and 
methodology.
Both studies followed an appropriate two-level 
method for localising patterns of deﬁ  cits, a ﬁ  rst-
pass coarse-grain and then a second-pass ﬁ  ne-grain 
analysis. However, there was a difference between the 
two studies in both the coarse-grain and the ﬁ  ne-
grain procedure employed. Thus, the coarse-grain 
analysis used by Aron et al. (2004) involved compar-
ing the effects of left frontal and right frontal lesions 
with control performance, but in the Shallice et al. 
(2008b) case a contrast was drawn between each 
of four groups – left lateral, right lateral, superior 
medial and inferior medial – and the controls. In the 
ﬁ  ne-grain analysis, Aron et al. (2004) took patients 
with lesions to one or other frontal lobe and corre-
lated particular aspects of their performance with the 
proportion of each gyrus that was damaged. More 
simply,  Shallice et  al.  (2008b)  took each Petrides 
and Pandya (1999) region of frontal cortex, and 
compared the performance of patients with damage 
to that region with that of all the other patients with 
frontal lesions. Both types of neuropsychological 
ﬁ  ne-grain analysis procedures make strong assump-
tions and both are subject to the possible problem 
of associated deﬁ  cits from lesions extending into 
neighbouring regions. Therefore it is argued in our 
paper that it is critical that the ﬁ  ne-grain effects are 
consistent with the coarse-grain ones; if not, this 
increases the possibility that ﬁ  ne-grain effects could 
result from associated deﬁ  cits.
At the coarse-grain level Aron et al. (2004) com-
pared left frontal and right frontal patients; the 
Shallice et  al.  (2008b)  study compared left lateral, 
right lateral and two medial groups, superior and 
inferior. On all reaction time measures in our study 
it is only the Superior Medial group that is slowed. 
Moreover, this slowing interacts with many variables 
such as switch trials versus repeat trials, incongruent 
trials (where the two tasks lead to different response 
outcomes given the same stimulus) versus congruent 
trials, harder versus easier tasks. This slowing with the 
Superior Medial lesions is closely analogous to effects 
found in a variety of other reaction time studies of 
frontal patients (e.g. Alexander et al., 2005, 2007; Stuss 
et al., 2002, 2005). It ﬁ  ts with the idea that systems 
in the Superior Medial region, probably the anterior 
cingulate and/or the pre-SMA (see Rushworth et al., 
2002), are critical for the energisation (cognitive 
effort) necessary to activate operations not directly 
triggered in an overlearned fashion by perceptual and 
motivational inputs. Both functional imaging meta-
analyses of task-switching produce activation of the 
anterior cingulate. Thus the four-group coarse-grain 
procedure is likely to be preferable to the two-group 
coarse grain procedure as far as localisation of pre-
frontal functional systems is concerned.
For the ﬁ  ne-grain analyses Aron et  al. (2004) 
used the percentage of particular gyri affected 
(superior, middle, and inferior frontal, orbital and 
medial) and Shallice et al. (2008b) used difference 
between presence and absence of damage to partic-
ular frontal areas as deﬁ  ned by Petrides and Pandya 
(1999). Both studies obtained similar results on the 
coarse grain procedure as far as localisation is con-
cerned in the left lateral frontal region. The ﬁ  ne-
grain effects were consistent across the two studies, 
with the Aron et  al. (2004) study suggesting the 
middle frontal gyrus is the critical locus and the 
Shallice et al. (2008b) one an area within it, 9/46v, 
but only as a trend, so there is no strong sugges-
tion that either ﬁ  ne-grain procedure is inferior to 
the other. As far as the functional imaging meta-
analyses are concerned, in the Derrfuss et al. (2005) 
paper this region does not seem to be activated but 
in the Buchsbaum et al. (2005) it is. There is thus 
a convergence in the pattern of results across all 
studies as far as the involvement of the left lateral 
prefrontal cortex is concerned, although there are 
possible differences in the speciﬁ  c region involved.
Even the apparently similar left lateral effects 
obtained in the two neuropsychological studies, 
though, differed in terms of the variable involved. In 
the Aron et al. (2004) study, patients with left fron-
tal lesions were slowed down more by a switch than 
were control subjects (a larger reaction time switch 
cost). In contrast, in our study the increased switch 
cost in patients with lateral frontal lesions occurred 
for the errors rather than reaction time. However, 
in addition, our paper points to the importance of 
a variable not considered in many task-switch-
ing studies, namely the degree of practice. The left 
lateral effect on errors concerned this variable; this 
group showed a signiﬁ  cantly greater change in error 
rate from the ﬁ  rst half to the second half of the 
experiment than the controls or the other patient 
groups. The left lateral patients had over double the 
error rate of the controls in the ﬁ  rst half, but were 
virtually at the control rate in the second half. This 
is a similar effect to that shown by Alexander et al. 
(2005) in a study of the acquisition of a serial reac-
tion time paradigm. As in our study the left lateral 
group were as fast as any other group including the 
control group from the start. However, they made 
signiﬁ   cantly more errors on the ﬁ   rst 100 trials 
whereas on the next 400 trials their error rate was 
normal. This pair of studies point to the importance 
of the left lateral region in task-setting, the proc-
esses which allow task performance to move from 
a novel to a routinised state (see Stuss et al., 1995). 
This is somewhat related to the argument presented 
by Aron et al. (2004) for their left frontal effects, 
namely that there is weaker endogenous control of 
task-set in left frontal patients and to the argument 
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of Derrfuss et al. (2005) that the left inferior fron-
tal junction is involved in the updating of task rep-
resentations. Our position is that such updating is 
operating throughout the whole process of learning 
the task and not just on a single trial.
In addition to the difference concerning the 
Superior Medial ﬁ  ndings, other ﬁ  ndings also differed 
between the two studies. The Aron et al. (2004) study 
found effects of right inferior frontal gyrus lesions 
and the Shallice et al. (2008b) one of orbital frontal 
lesions, neither of which was found in the other study. 
This points to the importance of group composition, 
and to the speciﬁ  c behavioural characteristics of the 
task in addition to the analysis procedures. Thus as 
far as group composition is concerned, the absence 
of a Superior Medial effect in the Aron et al. (2004) 
study may well be due to the fact that their patients 
had few sizeable lesions involving the medial region, 
especially in the critical left frontal group.
An effect which was found in our study but not in 
the Aron et al. (2004) study was a highly signiﬁ  cant 
increase in errors compared with controls in the 
Inferior Medial group. This effect was found both 
for repeat as well as switch trials and it was found 
for both preparation intervals, for the 1500 ms gap 
between cue and stimulus as well as for the 200 ms 
gap. The Inferior Medial region includes the orbital 
prefrontal cortex. Patients with orbital prefrontal 
lesions make much higher error rates on memory 
tasks where the chance of error is increased by the 
use of category cueing (Turner et al., 2007). Such a 
lesion may well lower the subjective cost of an error 
(Rolls, 2004); the subject is less careful. In a behav-
ioural task switching study where there are compet-
ing task-sets such a tendency could well produce a 
higher error rate. The effects may also be similar to 
the inability of patients to evaluate risk in gambling 
paradigms (Floden et al., 2008).
One contrasting effect that was found in the study 
of Aron et al. (2004) but where no analogous effect 
was found in our study is an increased error rate on 
switch trials in their right frontal group. Aron et al. 
(2004) link the error phenomenon they observed in 
their coarse-grain analysis with a reaction time effect 
they found only in their ﬁ  ne-grain analysis. This lat-
ter effect was that the larger the lesion in the region 
of the pars opercularis in the right inferior frontal 
gyrus the larger was the reaction time switch cost. 
They argue that this region contains a subsystem 
involved in inhibiting erroneous responses (see also 
Aron and Poldrack, 2006). There was no analogous 
effect in our study. We have previously considered 
that regions of the right lateral frontal cortex might 
be involved in monitoring task performance – in 
reacting rapidly and accurately to multidimensional 
stimuli (Stuss et al., 2002), in increasing prepara-
tion while a cued interval passes (Stuss et al., 2005), 
in avoiding capture errors (Reverberi et al., 2005), 
in judging the passage of time (Picton et al., 2006) 
or in counting sounds (Shallice et  al., 2008a). 
Impairments in performance monitoring (e.g. not 
noticing that switching is required or had not been 
carried out) might also explain the ﬁ  ndings in the 
Aron et al. (2004) study.
The differences in patterns of performance 
between the two studies may derive from the com-
position of the two patient populations and from the 
group study analysis methodology used. However, as 
important a factor is likely to be the speciﬁ  c version 
of task-switching employed. Our study differed from 
that of Aron et al. (2004) and was   unusual but far 
from unique in not ﬁ  nding a reduction in switch 
costs with an increased preparation   interval. In our 
paradigm, preparation effects would be expected to 
be less as, unlike most other studies, we maintained 
the interval between stimuli in successive trials con-
stant whatever the preparation interval, so as to 
avoid differences between conditions in task-set dis-
sipation which Meiran et al. (2000) had shown to be 
an important variable for the size of the switch cost. 
An increased preparation interval did, however, have 
a major effect. It led to an overall reduction in reac-
tion time on both switch and repeat trials, of 287 ms 
in the control group and a dramatic 613 ms in the 
Superior Medial group. This suggests that the speciﬁ  c 
paradigm used led patients, and possibly also con-
trols, to prepare when to respond rather than how to 
respond according to a speciﬁ  c task-set, a possibility 
that has been considered by Meiran et al. (2000) and 
Altmann (2005) in other task-switching situations. 
It is relevant in this respect that the patient groups in 
the Aron et al. (2004) study had if anything smaller 
preparation effects than the control group. This sup-
ports the possibility that there was a population dif-
ference between the two studies with medial patients, 
and in particular that Superior Medial patients were 
less well represented in the Aron et al. (2004) study.
Overall our study shows the importance of 
a number of frontally located processes in task 
switching paradigms (see Figure 2). These proc-
esses, which were analysed within the framework 
of a Supervisory system approach (see Shallice and 
Burgess, 1996; Stuss et al. 1995) are, however, held 
to have much wider relevance than task-switching 
per se. So-called task-setting may be conceived as 
operating over the short-term or the longer term; 
analogous effects to those obtained here in the left 
lateral prefrontal cortex have been found in a neu-
ropsychological group study employing a rather 
different type reaction time task – that of Alexander 
et al. (2005) (see also Stuss et al., 2002). The ener-
gisation effects found in the Superior Medial group 
are consonant with those found in a range of 
studies using other paradigms, such as Stuss et al. 
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Figure 2 | The conceptual framework of the paper based on the Supervisory System framework (Shallice and Burgess, 
1996; Stuss et al., 1995). The inner green boxes and yellow arrows represent on-line processes which (following learning) would 
be realised in contention scheduling. The outer blue boxes and arrows represent supervisory control processes. These include 
(in the early stages of learning) task rules operating as explicit if-then contingencies. The four patient groups discussed – left 
lateral, right lateral, superior medial and inferior medial – are held to have impairments in different supervisory processes.
(2002, 2005), Alexander et al. (2005, 2007), Picton 
et al. (2006, 2007), Shallice et al. (2008a); they had 
the properties to be expected of an impairment to 
the energisation process. Finally, analogous error 
effects to those obtained in the Inferior Medial 
group attributable to impairments to an attentive-
ness process have not previously been found to our 
knowledge in reaction time paradigms with such 
patients. However, they can be related to analogous 
tendencies to produce errors in this patient group 
in other cognitive domains.
At the end of the 20th century the task switch-
ing type of paradigm was abstracted as an idealised 
simpliﬁ  cation of set-switching processes known to 
be critical for effective performance on the most 
famous clinical test of prefrontal impairment, 
Wisconsin Card-Sorting. During the early years of 
the 21st century neuropsychological group stud-
ies have demonstrated how many processes are 
involved even in this simpliﬁ  ed paradigm!
CONFLICT OF INTEREST STATEMENT
The authors declare that the research was conducted 
in the absence of any commercial or ﬁ  nancial rela-
tionships that could be construed as a potential 
conﬂ  ict of interest.
REFERENCES
Alexander, M. P., Stuss, D. T., Picton, T. W., Shallice, T., 
and Gillingham, S. (2007). Regional frontal inju-
ries cause distinct impairments in cognitive con-
trol. Neurology 68, 1515–1523.
Alexander, M. P., Stuss, D. T., Shallice, T., 
Picton,  T.  W., and Gillingham, S. (2005). 
Impaired concentration due to frontal lobe 
damage from two distinct lesion sites. Neurology 
65, 572–579.
Allport, D. A., Styles, E. A., and Hsieh, S. (1994). 
Shifting intentional set: exploring the dynamic 
control of tasks. In Attention and Performance, 
Vol. XV, C. Umilta and M. Moscovitch, eds 
(Cambridge, MA, MIT Press), pp. 421–452.
Allport, D. A., and Wylie, G. (2000). “Task-switching”, 
stimuli-response bindings, and negative prim-
ing. In Attention and Performance, Vol. XVIII: 
Control of Cognitive Processes, S. Monsell and 
J.  S. Driver, eds (Cambridge, MA, MIT Press), 
pp. 35–70.
Altmann, E. M. (2005). Repetition priming in task 
switching: do the beneﬁ  ts  dissipate?  Psychon. 
Bull. Rev. 12, 535–540.
Aron, A. R., Monsell, S., Sahakian, B. J., and 
Robbins, T. W. (2004). A componential analysis of 
task-switching deﬁ  cits associated with lesions of 
left and right frontal cortex. Brain 127, 1561–1573.
Aron, A. R., and Poldrack, R. A. (2006). Cortical and 
subcortical contributions to stop signal response 
inhibition: role of the subthalamic nucleus. 
J. Neurosci. 26, 2424–2433.
Atkinson, R. C., and Shiffrin, R. M. (1968). Human 
memory: a proposed system and its control 
processes. In The Psychology of Learning and 
Motivation: Advances in Research and Theory, K. 
W. Spence and J. T. Spence, eds (New York, NY, 
Academic Press), pp. 89–195.
Brass, M., and von Cramon, D. Y. (2002). The role 
of the frontal cortex in task preparation. Cereb. 
Cortex 12, 908–914.
Braver, T. S., Reynolds, J. R., and Donaldson, D. I. 
(2003). Neural mechanisms of transient and sus-
tained cognitive control during task switching. 
Neuron 39, 713–726.
Buchsbaum, B. R., Greer, S., Chang, W. L., and 
Berman, K. F. (2005). Meta-analysis of neuroim-
aging studies of the Wisconsin card-sorting task 
and component processes. Hum. Brain Mapp. 25, 
35–45.
Derrfuss, J., Brass, M., Neumann, J., and 
von  Cramon,  D. Y. (2005). Involvement of the 
inferior frontal junction in cognitive control: 
meta-analyses of switching and Stroop studies. 
Hum. Brain Mapp. 25, 22–34.
DiGirolamo, G. J., Kramer, A. F., Barad, V., 
Cepeda, N. J., Weissman, D. H., Milham, M. P., 
Shallice et al.Frontiers in Neuroscience  July  2008 | Volume  2 | Issue  1 | 85
Wszalek, T. M., Cohen, N. J., Banich, M. T., 
Webb,  A. Belopolsky, A. V., and McAuley, E. 
(2001). General and task-speciﬁ   c frontal lobe 
recruitment in older adults during executive 
processes: a fMRI investigation of task-switching. 
Neuroreport 12, 2065–2071.
Floden, D., Alexander, M. P., Kubu, C. S., Katz, D., 
and Stuss, D. T. (2008). Impulsivity and risk-
taking behavior in focal frontal lobe lesions. 
Neuropsychologia 46, 213–223.
Gilbert, S. J., and Shallice, T. (2002). Task switching: a 
PDP model. Cogn. Psychol. 44, 297–337.
Luks, T. L., Simpson, G. V., Feiwell, R. J., and 
Miller, W. L. (2002). Evidence for anterior cingu-
late cortex involvement in monitoring prepara-
tory attentional set. Neuroimage 17, 792–802.
Mayr, U., Diedrichsen, J., Ivry, R., and Keele, S. W. 
(2006). Dissociating task-set selection from task-
set inhibition in the prefrontal cortex. J. Cogn. 
Neurosci. 18, 14–21.
Mecklinger, A. D., von Cramon, D. Y., Springer, A., and 
Matthes-von Cramon, G. (1999). Executive con-
trol functions in task switching: evidence from 
brain injured patients. J. Clin. Exp. Neuropsychol. 
21, 606–619.
Meiran, N. (1996). Reconﬁ   guration of processing 
mode prior to task performance. J. Exp. Psychol. 
Learn. Mem. Cogn. 22, 1432–1442.
Meiran, N., Chorev, Z., and Sapir, A. (2000). 
Component processes in task switching. Cogn. 
Psychol. 41, 211–253.
Milner, B. (1963). Effects of different brain lesions 
on card sorting: the role of frontal lobes. Arch. 
Neurol. 9, 90–100.
Monsell, S. (2003). Task switching. Trends Cogn. Sci. 
7, 134–140.
Owen, A. M., Downes, J. J., Sahakian, B. J., Polkey, C. E., 
and Robbins, T. W. (1990). Planning and spatial 
working memory following frontal-lobe lesions 
in man. Neuropsychologia 28, 1021–1034.
Petrides, M., and Pandya, D. N. (1999). Dorsolateral 
prefrontal cortex: comparative cytoarchitectonic 
analysis in the human and the macaque brain 
and corticocortical connection patterns. Eur. 
J. Neurosci. 11, 1011–1036.
Picton, T. W., Stuss, D. T., Alexander, M. P., Shallice, T., 
Binns, M. A., and Gillingham, S. (2007). Effects 
of focal lesions on response inhibition. Cereb. 
Cortex 17, 826–838.
Picton, T. W., Stuss, D. T., Shallice, T., Alexander, M. P., 
and Gillingham, S. (2006). Keeping time: effects 
of focal frontal lesions. Neuropsychologia 44, 
1195–1209.
Reverberi, C., Lavaroni, A., Gigli, G. L., Skrap, M., and 
Shallice, T. (2005). Speciﬁ  c impairments of rule 
induction in different frontal lobe subgroups. 
Neuropsychologia 43, 460–472.
Rogers, R. D., and Monsell, S. (1995). Costs of a pre-
dictable switch between simple cognitive tasks. 
J. Exp. Psychol. Gen. 124, 207–231.
Rolls, E. T. (2004). The functions of the orbitofrontal 
cortex. Brain Cogn. 55, 11–29.
Rushworth, M. F. S., Hadland, K. A., Paus, T., and 
Sipila, P. K. (2002). Role of human medial frontal 
cortex in task switching: a combined fMRI and 
TMS study. J. Neurophysiol. 87, 2577–2592.
Schneider, W., and Shiffrin, R. M. (1977). Controlled and 
automatic human information processing: 1. Detection, 
search, and attention. Psychol. Rev. 84, 1–66.
Shallice, T., and Burgess, P. W. (1996). Domains of 
supervisory control and the temporal organisa-
tion of behaviour. Philos. Trans. R. Soc. Lond., B, 
Biol. Sci. 351, 1405–1412.
Shallice, T., Stuss, D. T., Alexander, M. P., Picton, T. W., 
and Derkzen, D. (2008a). The multiple dimen-
sions of sustained attention. Cortex 44, 794–805.
Shallice, T., Stuss, D. T., Picton, T. W., Alexander, M. P., 
and Gillingham, S. (2008b). Multiple effects of 
prefrontal lesions on task-switching. Front. Hum. 
Neurosci. 1, 1–12.
Stuss, D. T., Alexander, M. P., Shallice, T., Picton, T. W., 
Binns, M. A., Macdonald, R., Borowiec, A., 
and Katz, D. I. (2005). Multiple frontal systems 
  controlling response speed. Neuropsychologia 43, 
396–417.
Stuss, D. T., Binns, M. A., Murphy, K. J., and Alexander, M. 
P. (2002). Dissociations within the anterior atten-
tional system: effects of task complexity and irrel-
evant information on reaction time speed and 
accuracy. Neuropsychology 16, 500–513.
Stuss, D. T., Levine, B., Alexander, M. P., Hong, J., 
Palumbo, C., Hamer, L., Murphy, K. J., and 
Izukawa, D. (2000). Wisconsin Card Sorting Test 
performance in patients with focal frontal and 
posterior brain damage: effects of lesion location 
and test structure on separable cognitive proc-
esses. Neuropsychologia 38, 388–402.
Stuss, D. T., Shallice, T., Alexander, M. P., and 
Picton, T. W. (1995). A multidisciplinary approach 
to anterior attentional functions. Ann. N. Y. Acad. 
Sci. 769, 191–211.
Turner, M. S., Cipolotti, L., Yousry, T., and Shallice, T. 
(2007). Qualitatively different memory 
impairments across frontal lobe subgroups. 
Neuropsychologia 45, 1540–1552.
Wager, T. D., Jonides, J., and Reading, S. (2004). 
Neuroimaging studies of shifting attention: a 
meta-analysis. Neuroimage 22, 1679–1693.
Received: 23 April 2008; accepted: 16 June 2008.
Citation: Front. Neurosci. (2008) 2, 1: 79–85, 
doi: 10.3389/neuro.01.013.2008
Copyright © 2008 Shallice, Stuss, Picton, Alexander 
and Gillingham. This is an open-access article 
subject to an exclusive license agreement between 
the authors and the Frontiers Research Foundation, 
which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and 
reproduction in any medium, provided the original 
authors and source are credited.
Task switching and frontal lesions